En filosofía de la percepción el relacionamiento con el entorno es el terreno donde el Realismo Ingenuo y el Intencionalismo se posicionan como dos posturas contrarias. La primera de ellas presenta una explicación que satisface al que busca un esclarecimiento del relacionamiento íntimo en la presentación del entorno durante la percepción, mientras que la otra teoría podría satisfacer a aquellos que buscan un esclarecimiento de la manera en la cual el entorno se presente de tal o cual modo a diferentes (...) percipientes, dando espacio para la formación de juicios y creencias particulares. Pero ¿podrá existir un planteamiento intermedio que asegure la intimidad de la presentación perceptual y la representación del entorno? El siguiente articulo expondrá los elementos del debate abordando una definición de cada teoría, luego avanzando hacia una alternativa intermedia y, finalmente, concluyendo de la posibilidad de tal postura intermedia, pero con un enfoque representacional dinámico. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos estudiar la recepción del pensamiento kantiano en España. Tras las primeras traducciones y referencias, nos detenemos en el cardenal Cefenno González, Balmes, Perojo, Menéndez Pelayo y Palacio Valdés; y ya en el siglo XX, en los del noventa y ocho, y después, de manera especial, en Ortega y en García Morente.

En este artículo nos proponemos estudiar la recepción del pensamiento kantiano en España. Tras las primeras traducciones y referencias, nos detenemos en el cardenal Cefenno González, Balmes, Perojo, Menéndez Pelayo y Palacio Valdés; y ya en el siglo XX, en los del noventa y ocho, y después, de manera especial, en Ortega y en García Morente.

This paper offers new arguments to reject the alleged dream of immortality. In order to do this, I firstly introduce an amendment to Michael Hauskeller’s approach of the “immortalist fallacy”. I argue that the conclusion “we do not want to live forever” does not follow from the premise “we do not want to die”. Next, I propose the philosophical turn from “normally” to “under these circumstances” to resolve this logical error. Then, I review strong philosophical critiques of this transhumanist purpose (...) of immortality in the literature. There are two key questions related to the possibility of fulfilling this goal: the hard problem of consciousness and the personal identity dilemma. Finally, I defend a specific type of indefinite life and justify that it is more desirable than our current limited life. (shrink)

Research on quotation has mostly focussed in the past years on mixed or open quotation. In a recent book-length discussion of the topic, Cappelen and Lepore have abandon their previous Davidsonian allegiances, proposing a new view that they describe as minimalist, to a good extend on the basis of facts concerning mixed quotation. In this paper I critically review Cappelen and Lepore’s new minimalist proposals, briefly outlining my preferred Davidsonian view as a useful foil. I explore first their allegedly non-Davidsonian, (...) anti-contextualist views about pure quotation, and then their new views on mixed quotation. I have complained in the first place that their proposals are not presented as perspicuously as they should be; and in the second place that, when we have a clearer picture of what appears to be the favoured account, the differences with their previous proposals and others already in the literature are not as great as they claim. (shrink)

Los Salmanticen-ses fueron teólogos que enseña-ron en el Colegio universitario salmanticenses de los carmelitas descalzos durante el siglo XVII y primera parte del XVIII. A ellos se deben el “Cursus theologi-cus salmanticensis”, así como el “Cursus moralis salmanticensis”. El tratado de penitencia del Cur-sus theologicus salmanticensisestá dividido en dos partes bien diferenciadas, aunque íntima-mente relacionadas: 1. La peni-tencia como sacramento. 2. La penitencia como virtud. Resumi-mos aquí sobre todo lo que se refiere la Penitencia como sacra-mento. Nuestro método es analí-tico (...) y comparativo, y el objeto de nuestra investigación consiste en la síntesis, el análisis y el comen-tario de los textos más destaca-dos sobre la materia penitencial. (shrink)

The author builds a realistic theory of democracy to end the false idea that corruption, state crime, and public immorality are democracy's products, not the natural and inevitable fruits of oligarchic regimes. Important theories of the state and constitution exist, but none can be called a theory of democracy.

(2001). Disability: Societal Responses to Difference and Interdisciplinary Interventions by Bioethicists. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 62-63.

In recent work, Walton has abandoned his very influential account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples allegedly showing that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. In this paper, both in support and further elaboration of a constitutive-norms speech-act variation on Walton’s account that I have defended previously, I critically discuss (...) his objections. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, I provide additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis-à- institutional accounts like Walton’s, and Gricean speech-act proposals. (shrink)

Only Imagine is a wonderful book. Clear and tersely written, it provides a compelling defence of a rather unpopular view : namely, extreme intentionalism about the determination of fictional content and the nature of fictionality. It thus unquestionably advances the philosophical debate. It is also a pleasure to read for those of us who like fictions and not just the philosophy thereof: Stock discusses for her arguments many examples from real fictions, systematically making perceptive remarks. Here I will respond to (...) an objection that she makes to the normative account that I have defended in previous work, arguing that it has explanatory advantages grounded on the subordination on that account of author-intentions to fictional contents independently determined by social practices. (shrink)

Online Public Shaming is a form of norm enforcement that involves collectively imposing reputational costs on a person for having a certain kind of moral character. OPS actions aim to disqualify her from public discussion and certain normal human relations. We argue that this constitutes an informal collective punishment that it is presumptively wrong to impose on others. OPS functions as a form of ostracism that fails to show equal basic respect to its targets. Additionally, in seeking to mobilise unconstrained (...) collective power with potentially serious punitive consequences, OPS is incompatible with due process values. (shrink)

RESUMENInforme bibliográfico de las obras de Maurice Merleau-Ponty hasta 1996, que revisa y actualiza repertorios anteriores. El informe incluye también trabajos inéditos y documentos de su legado personal.PALABRAS CLAVEMERLEAU-PONTY-FILOSOFIA FRANCESA-FENOMENOLOGIAABSTRACTBibliographical report of Maurice Merleau-Ponry's works up to 1996, wich revises and updates previous bibliographies. The report also includes unpublished papers and documents from his personal legacy. KEYWORDSMERLEAU-PONTY- FRENCH PHILOSOPHY-PHENOMENOLOGY.

RESUMENLa interpretación actual de la ciencia cartesiana ya no concibe ésta como una mera deducción desde los principios metafísicos, sino que reivindica el papel de la experiencia en ella. El presente artículo tratará de dar un paso más, defendiendo que existe una dimensión instrumental en la ciencia cartesiana. Para ello, se analizará la modificación que Descartes realiza en la Dióptrica de la relación artificial-natural y que posibilita una lectura instrumentalista.PALABRAS CLAVEDESCARTES, ARTIFICIAL, NATURAL, INSTRUMENTALISMO, CIENCIAABSTRACTThe current interpretation of the Cartesian science (...) no longer sees it as a mere deduction from the metaphysical principles, but claims the role of experience in it. This paper will try to go one step further, arguing that there is an instrumental dimension in the Cartesian science. With this purpose in mind, we will analyze the modification performed by Descartes in the Dioptrics regarding the artifitial-natural relation, which enables this instrumentalist reading.KEYWORDS DESCARTES, ARTIFICIAL, NATURAL, INSTRUMENTALISM, SCIENCE. (shrink)

Quién es el hombre. Un espíritu en el tiempo es un libro que muestra de qué modo están involucrados los órdenes sociales en la filosofía poliana. En esta obra Leonardo Polo presenta explícitamente su pensamiento político en dos fases. En la primera diagnostica sobre la situación política actual. En la segunda propone un modelo de gobierno que empodera a la sociedad civil, y un orden político-económico fundamentado en el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad.

La fenomenología de la religión es una de las ciencias de las religiones surgida en el siglo XIX. Tras una época dorada, las dificultades epistemológicas y los debates suscitados en torno al estatuto del saber la abocaron a una profunda crisis interna. En la actualidad, existen dos formas de entender la fenomenología de la religión: la primera, como historia comparada de las religiones, centrada en la descripción y clasificación de los fenómenos religiosos; la segunda, como fenomenología hermenéutica, centrada en la (...) comprensión del fenómeno religioso. Ambas corrientes constituyen dos visiones divergentes de la fenomenología de la religión. Sin embargo, podrían concebirse como dos fases fenomenológicas convergentes que apuntan a la consolidación de una antropología filosófica de la religión. En este artículo, analizamos el objetivo, los principales representantes, las dificultades epistemológicas y los logros de cada una de estas for-mas de comprender la fenomenología de la religión y su posible conjugación en la configuración de una filosofía fenomenológica de la religión.The phenomenology of religion is one of the sciences of religions emerged in the 19th century. After a golden age, the epistemological difficulties, and the debates about the status of knowledge led to a deep internal crisis. At present, there are two ways of understanding the phenomenology of religion: the first, as a com-parative history of religions, focused on description and classification of religious phenomena; the second, as a hermeneutical phenomenology, focused on the understanding of religious phenomena. Both currents constitute two divergent views of phenomenology of religion. However, they can be conceived as two convergent phenomenological phases that point to the consoli-dation of a philosophical anthropology of religion. In this paper, we analyze the goal, main representatives, epistemological difficulties and achievements of each of these ways of understanding the phenomenology of religion and its possible conjugation in the configuration of a phenomenological philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Resumen:Por un lado, el trabajo pretende mostrar de qué modo el “tono” de Arendt en sus trabajos académicos, tal y como lo señalara Scholem en una de sus misivas críticas a la autora, lejos de ser frívolo o burlón (como se apuntaba en esa crítica) produce una brecha perturbadora, por la cual los lectores y las lectoras de Hannah Arendt pueden desvelar hipocresías y actuar con una nueva responsabilidad. Por otro lado, el artículo señala diversos conceptos filosóficos, algunos ya sometidos (...) a investigación por Arendt, que en sí mismos presentan la fuerza de crear un mundo y unos seres humanos, con la energía teórica y real necesaria como para transformarlos: “pensar”, “actuar”, “amar”, son algunos de ellos. En este último sendero, utilizaremos la ayuda de sus discípulas, Fina Birulés y Marina Garcés.Palabras clave: Hannah Arendt; Tono; Filosofía moral; Responsabilidad; Compasión; Historia. (shrink)

The paper provides an opinionated survey of recent contributions – roughly, in the last decade – to our understanding of how names and other referring expressions work in fictional discourse and addresses well-known philosophical worries that they raise. Views about the semantics of referring expressions in fictional discourse are usually accompanied by metaphysical views on the ontology of fictional characters, so this will also come under our focus.

El presente trabajo se propone determinar un criterio con que interpretar de modo global el desarrollo del pensamiento de Giovanni Gentile. Su caracterización como pensador neohegeliano no da razón del sentido global de su filosofía ni de sus efectivos puntos de partida ni de los pensadores con los que directamente se midió. El trabajo hace ver que, con Donato Jaja, su maestro universitario, la tradición idealista iniciada por Bertrando Spaventa se separa definitivamente de la interpretación de Hegel y se constituye (...) como tradición autónoma. En ese sentido, buscamos precisar los rasgos característicos de la personalidad filosófica de Gentile dentro de dicha tradición y concluimos que Vico ocupó un papel nuclear en ella. (shrink)

Schiffer has given an argument against supervaluationist accounts of vagueness, based on reports of vague contents. Suppose that Al tells Bob ‘Ben was there’, pointing to a certain place, and later Bob says, ‘Al said that Ben was there’, pointing in the same direction. According to supervaluationist semantics, Schiffer contends, both Al’s and Bob’s utterances of ‘there’ indeterminately refer to myriad precise regions of space; Al’s utterance is true just in case Ben was in any of those precisely bounded regions (...) of space, and Bob’s is true just in case Al said of each of them that it is where Ben was. However, while the supervaluationist truth-conditions for Al’s utterance might be satisfied, those for Bob’s cannot; for Al didn’t say, of any of those precisely delimited regions of space, that it is where Ben was. In an earlier version of the material presented here (García-Carpintero 2000) I replied to Schiffer’s argument that supervaluationism has an independently well-motivated defense. The response is essentially based on the point that the occurrence of ‘there’ in Bob’s utterance (and of ‘tall’ in Wright’s argument) occurs in indirect discourse, and supervaluationists may allow that it shifts its referent there. Schiffer’s reply to this response shows that it was not made sufficiently clearly. In this paper I will try to improve on that score. In his more recent reply, Schiffer (2000b, 325) dismisses a proposal like the one I will make, mainly because it “undermines … a leading virtue of supervaluationism … its implication that vagueness is … not a feature of the world.” I will argue that my reply does not undermine the fundamental contentions of the supervaluationist account. (shrink)

I defend a Deferred Ostension view of quotation, on which quotation-marks are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstratum. On this view, the quoted material works like Nunberg’s indexes in his account of deferred ostensión in general. The referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation; in the default case the relation will be … instantiates the linguistic type __, but there are other possibilities. In this way, the (...) deferred ostension view deals with a problem I pointed out for the identity proposal in my earlier work, that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), or even other related tokens (see the examples on p. 261 of García-Carpintero 1994). (shrink)

Tommie Shelby has offered an influential, carefully stated, and well-argued set of objections to any volitional analysis of racism (VAR) as consisting centrally in certain forms of race-based disregard. Here I hope to defend aspects of VAR by analyzing, evaluating, and sometimes countering several of his major contentions, which have stood unchallenged in the literature over more than two decades. First, I sketch and respond to his Methodological objection to VAR, which criticizes VAR's reliance on language and linguistic intuitions; then (...) to a Psychological objection, which suggests that VAR implausibly distances an agent's intentions from her beliefs; and, finally, to a Psychopathological objection, which holds that VAR requires treating as unproblematic some psychological states better seen as aberrant. The following section treats three subtle counterexamples Shelby uses to challenge VAR's core contentions about what's necessary and what's sufficient for racism. I close with some gestures toward what I see as a promising approach, very different from his, to studying these topics. (shrink)